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PEACETIME USE OF FORCE, MILITARY
ACTIVITIES, AND THE NEW LAW
OF THE SEA

Francesco Francionif

INTRODUCTION
Resource exploitation was the central theme of the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention (the
Convention) achieved conspicuous innovations in this area by recognizing the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), expanding the Continental Shelf concept, and establishing an international regime for seabed
mining.' In contrast, military operations and the use of force remain
in the shadows of the new law of the sea. The Convention proclaims
the need for peaceful use of the oceans and expressly prohibits the use
of force.2 Yet military activities in the oceans of the world continue
and perhaps increase. Furthermore, the generalized widening of maritime jurisdiction is leading to a growing number of occasions for military confrontation between coastal states and naval powers.
In this situation, the question arises, "What will be the future
regulation of the use of force and military activities in the sea?" This
Article will focus on three issues. First, what is the impact of the new
law of the sea, as defined by conventional and customary international
law, on military activities and the use of force in the territorial sea and
internal waters? Second, how are military activities compatible with
the EEZ, and what international norms regulate the use of military
force in this area? Finally, does the language of the 1982 Convention,
with its emphasis on "peaceful use," impose any new obligation or
limitation on the use of military instruments at sea?
These questions are especially germane in light of article 298(b) of
the Convention. This article allows an exception to the compulsory
t Professor of International Law, University of Siena, Italy; Visiting Professor
Cornell Law School.
1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Apr. 30, 1982 (as approved
Sept. 24, 1982), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, parts V-VI, XI (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Convention].
2. Id. parts VII, XVI, arts. 88, 301. See also id. arts. 58(l) and 141, which call for
peaceful use of the sea in the context of the exclusive economic zone and seabed mining.
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settlement of disputes that may arise in law enforcement actions from
military activities and the use of force. 3 By permitting signatory states
to remove such matters from the scope of compulsory jurisdiction, the
Convention clearly acknowledges the special status of military activities and the use of force by government ships. In so doing, it confirms
the need to clarify the permissible scope of such activities in contemporary international law.
I.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES AND THE USE OF FORCE IN
THE TERRITORIAL SEA

Under both customary international law and article 2 of the Convention, the territorial sea is a space characterized by the inherent sovereignty of the coastal state. In this area, the coastal state may
therefore exercise some degree of interference with respect to foreign
military operations. Two separate questions arise regarding the limits
of military activity and the use of force in the territorial sea. First, are
foreign military activities permissible at all? Second, what degree of
force may lawfully be exercised (1) by the coastal state to repel intruders and (2) by the foreign navy to assert navigational rights against the
coastal state's territorial claim?

A.

LEGITIMATE MILITARY USE OF THE TERRITORIAL SEA BY
FOREIGN VESSELS

In the past, the question of permissible military activity by foreign
ships in the territorial sea has largely been identified with whether foreign warships enjoy a right of innocent passage through the territorial
sea. Under international law, innocent passage involves the transit of
foreign ships in a manner which is not prejudicial to the peace, good
order, and security of the coastal state. 4 The 1958 Geneva Convention
did not afford much clarification on the issue of innocent passage; arti5
cle 14 simply speaks of "ships."
Reflecting this ambiguity, the International Law Commission
(ILC) initially advocated the recognition of innocent passage to war3. Id. art. 298(b). Article 298 reads:

When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a
State may, without prejudice to the obligations arising under section 1, declare in
writing that it does not accept any one or more of the procedures provided for in
section 2 with respect to one or more of the following categories of disputes: . ..
(b) Disputes concerning military activities, including military activities by government vessels. . . and disputes concerning law enforcement activities in regard to
the exercise of sovereign rights or jurisdiction.
4. Id. art. 19(1).
5. Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958 (entered
into force Sept. 10, 1964), art. 14, 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205
[hereinafter cited as Convention on the Territorial Sea].
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ships "save in exceptional circumstances,"' 6 but later adhered to the
principle of the coastal state's consent and prior authorization. 7 Until
now, proponents of the traditional view that warships have the right of
innocent passage have prevailed over dissenters who have maintained
that the innocent passage of warships is incompatible with coastal sovereignty because warships have a different functional objective than
merchant vessels.8
The Third Conference on the Law of the Sea contributed significantly to the solution of the problem of innocent passage: it struck a
compromise by which states exchanged broader navigational rights to
foreign vessels in exchange for the recognition of wider territorial
waters and the extension of the coastal state's jurisdiction for resource
exploitation. As part of that compromise, the Convention text makes
clear that warships enjoy the right of innocent passage, but that they
may not engage in military activities during such passage. Thus in
defining those activities which are prejudicial to the peace, good order,
or security of the coastal state, article 19(2) specifies activities, such as
military exercises, firing of weapons, launching or taking on board aircraft, and threat or use of force, that have an unmistakable military
nature and can therefore be carried out only by warships. 9
These provisions of the Convention undoubtedly represent progress over the ambiguous language of the Geneva Convention. Not
only does article 19 of the Law of the Sea Convention provide a solution to the controversial problem of innocent passage for warships, but
it also clarifies the concept of innocent passage by identifying it
through the list of prohibited activities. Therefore, inasmuch as the
Convention's reasonable compromise corresponds to customary inter6. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 6 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/2693 (1954), reprinte4 in [1954] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 140, 161, U.N. Doc. A/CN.41 SER. A/1954/Add. 1.
7. Report of the International Law Commission to the General Assembly, 11 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 9), U.N. Doc. A/3/59 (1956), reprinted in [1956] 2 Y.B. INT'L L.
COMM'N 253, 276, U.N. Doc. A/CN 41 SER. A/956/Add. 1. The commentary to this

article pointed out that the principle of authorization and notification reflected the views
and comments expressed by governments on the matter. 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N at 27677. A convenient collection of such views can be found in M. WHITEMAN, 4 DIG. OF INT'L
L. 404 (1965). For a recent restatement of this traditional view on the right of innocent
passage of warships in light of the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, see Oxman, The
Regime of Warships Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 24 VA. J.
INT'L L. 809 (1984); Ronzitti, Ilpassaggioinoffensivo nel mare territorialee la Convenzione
delle Nazioni Unite sul diritto del Mare, 68 RIvISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE
[R1VISTA DIR. INT.] 32 (1985).
8. See, e.g., P. JEsSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURIS-

DICTION; Harvard Law School Draft Convention on Territorial Waters, 23 AM. J. INT'L
L., SPEC. Supp. 295 (1927/1929); I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 206 (1979).

9. Convention, supra note 1, art. 19(2).
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national law,' 0 foreign military vessels enjoy the right of innocent passage; but no military operations other than simple navigation are
permissible within the territorial sea.

Other rules of conventional or customary international law also
limit military use of the territorial sea by foreign navies. First, under

article 20 of the Convention, "submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and to show their flag."'I

This is a significant provision in light of the frequent incidents involving Soviet or unidentified submarines that have occurred in recent
years off of the coasts of several Western countries, such as Sweden,
Norway, and Italy.12 This requirement is especially relevant for
nuclear submarines which may, through unauthorized presence in for-

eign territorial waters, place the risk of radioactive pollution beyond

3
the coastal state's power of control.'
Second, under customary international law, there is no right of
overflight of the territorial sea, except as article 38 of the Convention
allows overflight for transit passage over straits. 14 A fortiori, coastal
states may altogether exclude any military operation by foreign aircraft in the airspace above their territorial waters.
Third, the Sea-Bed Arms Control Treaty prohibits states from
placing nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction beyond the

10. Id. The conflict that emerged during the Conference concerned mainly the group
of states who were insisting on prior notification and authorization and the Western maritime states who were insisting on the right of innocent passage without prior requirements.
Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Kampuchia, Malta, and
Turkey, among others, maintained the former position.
11. Id. art. 20.
12. For an example of submarine intrusions and incidents in territorial waters of Sweden and Norway, see Red Submarines, Time, May 9, 1983, at 57, col. 3. For submarine
intrusions in Italy, see Ronzitti, Sommergibili non identificati, pretese bale storiche e contromisure dello stato costiero: incidente del golfo di Taranto del 24-25 Febbraio1982, 66
RIViSTA DIR. INT.5, 14 (1983).
13. In the 1980 Yoron Jima incident, the Japanese government considered control over
such a risk so essential that Japan denied permission of passage to a disabled Soviet submarine which was being towed through Japanese territorial waters unless the Soviet Union
disclosed the full potential of radioactivity including that of the submarine's armament.
The Soviet government ignored the demand and continued its unauthorized passage. As a
consequence, Japan filed a protest against the Soviet Union. The incident was caused by a
fire which broke out on board the Soviet submarine causing the death of nine crewmen and
injury to several others. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 22, 1980, at A3, col. 1; id., Aug. 23, 1980, at
A5, col. 5. For a legal comment holding that the Japanese were entitled to obtain the
requested information under a rule of reciprocity (the Soviets have formulated a reservation
to article 23 of the Geneva Convention), see Grammig, The Yoron Jima Submarine Incident of August 1980: A Soviet Violation of the Law of the Sea, 22 HARV. INT'L L.J. 331
(1981). The Soviet position with respect to the coastal state's right to establish authorization procedures for the passage of foreign warships in territorial waters is discussed in W.
BUTLER, THE LAW OF SOVIET TERRITORIAL WATERS 40 (1967).
14. Convention, supra note 1, art. 38.
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twelve-mile coastal belt.1 5 This prohibition does not apply to the
coastal state, which retains the freedom of using or allowing its allies
to use the seabed zone within the twelve-mile limit for the emplace6
ment of such weapons.'

Finally, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which follows the provisions of

the 1963 Test Ban Treaty,' 7 prohibits the emplacement of nuclear
weapons in Latin America, including the territorial waters of the contracting parties.1 8 The Treaty of Tlatelolco extends its prohibition to
underwater tests, including the territorial sea.
B.

USE OF FORCE IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA

Apart from a situation of belligerency, the occasions in which the
territorial sea has been the theater for acts of force arise in two typical
situations. The first occurs when coastal states react against what they
perceive as a provocative or offensive act by foreign ships. The second
situation arises when a foreign state acts to assert navigational claims
against the coastal state.

The Pueblo incident of 1968 exemplifies the first situation. In that
incident, North Korean naval units used armed force in order to capture the United States' intelligence ship Pueblo. As a result of the
seizure, North Korea held the crew for several months, until the parties signed an agreement which permitted the crew to be released upon
U.S. acknowledgement of espionage activities, a recognition which the
15. See Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof, Feb. 11, 1971, 23 U.S.T. 701, T.I.A.S. No. 7337 [hereinafter cited as Seabed
Treaty]. Article II states that the twelve-mile zone "shall be co-terminous with the twelvemile outer limit of the zone referred to in part II of the [Geneva] Convention of the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone." See Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 5.
16. Id.
17. Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Underwater, Oct. 10, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43. Article I
of the treaty expressly bans nuclear testing in territorial waters and the high seas, but
makes no reference to tests under the seabed. Article I does ban all tests "in any other
environment if such explosion causes radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial
limits of the state under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted. One
might wonder whether nuclear experiments in the subsoil of the oceans beyond national
jurisdiction are prohibited by this Treaty. Since underground tests are prohibited when
they cause radioactive effects outside the territorial limits of the state under whose "jurisdiction" or "control" the test is conducted, it seems reasonable to conclude that similar
tests must be prohibited insofar as by definition, they are bound to cause radioactive debris
in the international area. See Brown, The Demilitarizationand DenuclearizationofHydrospace, 4 ANNALES OF ETUDES INTERNATIONALES 71 (1973). See also Schwelb, The
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and InternationalLaw, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1963); Martin,
Legal Aspects of Disarmament, 12 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1 (Supp. 7 1963).
18. Treaty of Tlatelolco, Feb. 14, 1967, 22 U.S.T. 762, T.I.A.S. No. 7137, commented
on in Robles, Mesure de Desarmament Dans Des Zones Particularies: Le Traite Visant
L 'InterdictionDes Armes Nuclearies en Amerique Latine, - Hague Receuil 43.

208

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:203

United States immediately disavowed. 19 The Gulf of Sirte incident of

August 1981 reveals a similar pattern of conflict during which Libya
asserted the legality of the use of force to protect coastal rights and the
20
United States defended the freedom of navigation of its fleet.

The Pueblo and Sirte disputes exemplify the circumstances in
which conflicting claims are likely to arise between coastal states and
foreign military vessels. These precedents illustrate the difficult question of whether force is admissible, and if so, what degree of coercion
may be used to enforce the coastal state's jurisdiction in its territorial
waters.
Those who uphold the principle of "complete immunity" of foreign warships hold that no force is allowable to enforce jurisdiction.
This principle derives from the combined interpretation of article 8 of
the 1958 Geneva Convention of the High Seas, which gives complete
immunity to warships on the high seas, and article 23 of the Geneva
Convention on the Territorial Sea, which provides that if a foreign
warship does not comply with a coastal state's regulations in the territorial sea, the coastal state may "require the ship to leave the territorial sea." 21 Since these provisions at once guarantee complete
immunity and fail to contemplate coercive measures against the illegal
presence of foreign warships in territorial waters, the conclusion is
that afortiorino use of force is admissible against a foreign warship in
22
the territorial sea except in self-defense.
Proponents of another view believe that it is necessary to determine the scope of the coastal state's lawful countermeasures by distinguishing between single violations of the coastal state's laws and
19. See the telegram sent by the Department of State to various diplomatic missions
after the incident, reprintedin ContemparyPracticeofthe United States Relating to InternationalLaw, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 754, 756 (1968); 58 DEP'T ST. BULL. 346, 352 (Mar. 1968).
The Department of State view is maintained by Aldrich, Questions of InternationalLaw
Raised by the Seizure of the U.S.S. Pueblo, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW PROCEEDINGS 2 (1969). But see Francioni, Il caso del "Pueblo" e le norme internazionali sullo spionaggio, 1969 DIRITTo INTERNAZIONALE 319, 336 (1969).
20. For a more complete account and analysis of the incident, see Francioni, The Gulf
of Sirte Incident (U.S. v. Libya) and InternationalLaw, 5 Y.B. INT'L L. 85 (1980-81);
Spinnato, Historic and Vital Bays: An Analysis of Libya's Claim to the Gulf of Sidra, 13
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L.J. 65 (1983/84); Francioni, The Status of the Gulf of Sirte in
InternationalLaw, 11 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 311 (1984). The United States action
was admittedly intended to challenge the legality of Libya's extension of coastal jurisdiction
to include the entire Gulf of Sirte, which, by a declaration of 1973, was "closed" on the
basis of alleged "historic titles." The Sirte incident is thus within the context of internal
waters. The incident also raises the territorial sea question, however, since the American
Sixth Fleet was just outside the boundary of the Gulf, an area that Libya claimed as territorial waters.
21. Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958 (entered into force Sept. 30, 1962), art.
8, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200; Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 5, art.
23.
22. See Aldrich, supra note 19, at 3.
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regulations with respect to navigation in the territorial sea and violations of international norms governing innocent passage. Only in the
latter case, according to this view, could the coastal state be entitled to
23
adopt coercive measures including the use of force.
Both of these approaches, however, lead to unsatisfactory results.
The first, which excludes force except in the extreme case of selfdefense against armed attack, is too rigid and does not indicate what a
coastal state may do if the foreign intruder continues to navigate in the
territorial sea, despite the request to leave and without regard to how
its continued presence may prejudice the coastal state's security. The
second approach introduces an element of artificiality by adopting a
double standard-international and internal-to appraise the effects of
the foreign ship's violation of the coastal state's territorial sovereignty.
Conceptually and practically, one cannot separate the violation of
the coastal state's regulations from the violation of "peace, good order
and security" upon which innocent passage is contingent. Moreover,
the 1982 Convention's list in article 19 of the activities that are not
consistent with the "innocent" character of passage leaves little margin for the possibility that foreign vessels' operations may constitute a
breach of coastal states' regulations without at the same time violating
the innocent passage rules. Furthermore, article 19 says that passage
of a foreign ship shall be considered prejudicial if it engages in "any
other activity not having a direct bearing on navigation. ' 24 Finally,
article 25(1) of the Convention allows ample police powers: "[t]he
coastal State may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to pre'2 5
vent passage which is not innocent."
The special character of this police power clause is emphasized by
its absence from part III of the Convention concerning passage
through straits. In view of this clause, it seems that one must rely on
the general rules of necessity and proportionality to decide when and
to what extent the use of force is admissible to prevent or terminate a
26
passage that the coastal state considers prejudicial.
Under these general rules of international law, necessity means
that the coastal states will have the initial burden of asking the foreign
ship engaged in non-innocent activities to leave its territorial waters.
23. Cf Fitzmaurice, Some Results of the Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea, 8
INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 73, 93 (1959); Ronzitti, supra note 12, at 14; Ronzitti, supra note 7;
DeLupis, Foreign Warships and Immunity for Espionage, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 53 (1984).
24. Convention, supra note 1, art. 19(2)(1).
25. Id. art. 25(1).
26. These principles have been developed in the law of state responsibility on the basis
of the well-known precedent of the Naulilaa incident (Portugal-Germany), 2 R. INT'L
ARB. AWARDS 1025. For the further development of the law of state responsibility which

followed the decision in Naulilaa,see Ago, Eighth Report on State Responsibility, [1979] 2
Y.B. INT'L L. COMM'N 40.
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Proportionality refers to the coastal state's subsequent options. If the
foreign ship does not leave, the coastal state may employ a limited and
controlled use of force to give ultimate warning, for example, by firing
solid shells near the ship or exploding depth charges to make a submarine emerge and identify itself. The rule of necessity also justifies the
use of force for the purpose of arresting and boarding the foreign vessel or submarine when necessary to prevent important information,
material, or devices from being removed illegally from the territorial
sea.
Force would be permissible when the foreign ship is engaged in
espionage activities, as in the Pueblo affair, and even more so when
such a ship has been testing the responsiveness of the coastal state's
defense system, simulating an armed attack, or mapping the network
of coastal defense for sabotage. Use of force with the intent of sinking
the foreign vessel or of destroying the foreign submarine in territorial
waters appears permissible only after all attempts to stop the intruder
or to force him to leave have been exhausted.
The second question about military force in the territorial sea
concerns the permissibility of force to assert navigational rights
against coastal states' claims. Despite the impressive number of conflicting claims with respect to national jurisdiction over adjacent
waters, the use of force to assert navigational rights against coastal
claims fortunately has not arisen very often in practice. Even in the
sensitive area of transit rights through international straits and
archipelagic waters, nations have generally claimed freedom of navigation and rights of unimpeded passage by diplomatic statements and
other peaceful steps rather than by military action. 27
A notable exception is the Corfu Channel case, which involved a
demonstration of force by the British navy to assert freedom of transit
through the Channel. In its judgment of 1949, the International Court
of Justice held that the mere assertion of navigational rights, even with
a show of force by a foreign fleet of war, does not in itself constitute an
illegal threat or use of force.28 However, in rejecting the Albanian
contention that the British warships had violated Albanian sovereignty by conducting a demonstration of force in the Channel, the
Court based its reasoning on a set of quite strict conditions. First, the
27. The closing of the Gulf of Aqaba in 1967 gave rise only to diplomatic protests, and
the assertion of an archipelagic claim by Indonesia and the Philippines in 1958 and 1968,
respectively, witnessed a remarkable level of self-restraint on the part of the British and
United States navies. Rather than seeking confrontation, war fleets were diverted from the
original route to more peripheral passages of the archipelago, or a procedure of prior notification was accepted as in the case of passage through the Philippine Strait of Balabac and
Basilan passage. For a thorough review of pertinent practice, see D.P. O'CONNELL, THE
INFLUENCE OF LAW ON SEA POWER 107 (1975).

28. Corfu Channel Case (Merits), 1949 I.C.J. 4.
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warships had traveled with their guns unloaded and "trained fore and
aft." Second, the fleet was not in combat formation. Third, there had
been no maneuvering. On the basis of this evidence the Court concluded that, by passing in this manner through the narrow channel
near the Albanian coast at a time of political tension, the British ships
intended "not only to test Albania's attitude, but at the same time to
demonstrate such force that she would abstain from firing again on
passing ships. Having regard, however, to all the circumstances of the
case. . . the Court is unable to characterize these measures taken by
'29
the United Kingdom as a violation of Albania's sovereignty.
The Court balanced its decision to favor innocent passage over
territorial sovereignty, even in a situation of political tension, against
the determination that actual intervention by the British navy in Albanian territorial waters to perform a mine sweeping operation was
unlawful. In rejecting the United Kingdom's contention that its unilateral mine clearance operation was necessary for transit and to
secure evidence (i.e., the presence and type of mines) of an international wrongful act, the Court said:
Between independent States, respect for territorial sovereignty is an essential
foundation of international relations. The Court recognizes that the Albanian
Government's complete failure to carry out its duties after the explosions, and
the dilatory nature of its diplomatic notes, are extenuating circumstances for
the action of the United Kingdom's Government. But to ensure respect for
international law, of which it is the organ, the Court must declare that the
30
action of the British Navy constituted a violation of Albanian sovereignty.

The Corfu precedent, therefore, does not warrant the conclusion
that threat or use of force may be permissible to challenge coastal
claims that infringe upon free navigation. The only expression of
"force" admissible under the standards set by the Court is that of
"showing the flag" in the contested area. Other forms of military pressure, such as carrying out maneuvers along the coast, assembling a
fleet in combat formation, or issuing an ultimatum or other open
threat would constitute a violation of international law. Indeed, in
both cases of innocent passage and conflicts like the Gulf of Sirte incident, the interested parties must respect the general obligation to seek
a peaceful solution to their dispute in accordance with articles 2(3)
and 33 of the Charter, to abstain from acts of force that endanger the
31
peace, and to refrain from acts that aggravate a dispute.
29. Id. at 31.
30. Id. at 35.
31. U.N. CHARTER arts. 2(3), 33.
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USE OF FORCE IN INTERNAL WATERS

The internal waters of the sea are completely assimilated to the
territory of the coastal state. Since foreign navies may invoke no right
of innocent passage in these waters, military activities are a fortiori
impermissible. By the same token, foreign states may exert neither use
nor threat of force in this area of coastal jurisdiction for the purpose of
challenging the title upon which the waters have been declared internal. The duty of maritime powers to seek peaceful solutions with
respect to conflicts and disputes involving coastal claims are all the
more applicable to internal waters. Furthermore, mere acts of expressive force, such as the showing of the flag, are unlawful in internal
waters as long as the coastal state does not grossly abuse its rights by
deceitfully appropriating large areas of the open seas as "internal
waters."
The fact that the unauthorized presence of foreign naval vessels in
the area of internal waters constitutes a prima facie violation of the
coastal state's territorial sovereignty is also significant in determining
the range of coercive countermeasures that the coastal state may adopt
against the foreign intruder. In this regard, it seems reasonable to
make the lawfulness of the use of force depend upon the nature of the
intrusion and the type of vessel involved. Covert naval operations,
especially with submarines, such as those which have occurred in
Scandinavian internal waters and more recently in the Gulf of
Taranto, clearly present a significant threat to the coastal state's security. 32 The potential danger posed by unauthorized foreign naval operations is undisclosed. It may include such acts as emplacement of
electronic devices to monitor coastal military activities, laying of navigational buoys on the seabed to guide an attack, visual and electronic
inspection of the coast in view of the landing of special commando
forces, and covert mining of certain areas to prevent access or transit
for enemy navies. All these acts represent a serious threat to the
coastal state's security, and it is within the scope of lawful countermeasures for the coastal state to use force in order to arrest and capture the intruder.33 In case of necessity, even violent measures are
permissible in order to disable and stop the foreign military vessel.
Such necessity may arise not only in the case of self-defense, but also
where the coastal state considers the recovery of data from an intruding ship essential for its security.
32. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
33. The coastal state may act under the "self-defense" provision of article 51 of the
U.N. Charter, i.e., in its inherent right as a state under international law. It may also act as
an exercise of police power within its territory. Under international law, a state may invoke
the international doctrine of "hot pursuit" to chase an intruder beyond its territorial
waters. See Convention on the High Seas, supra note 20, art. 23.
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When a foreign military vessel openly violates internal waters, the
same rules that govern the violation of innocent passage in the territorial sea apply. Under these rules, the coastal state must warn the foreign ship as a preliminary measure to any coercive act. The use of
force will only be justified for the purpose of directing the vessel
toward the open seas or of arresting and boarding the vessel in order
to collect evidence of the unlawful mission. The coastal state may not
use force to assert a territorial claim over its adjacent waters; such a
conflict between the coastal state and opposing maritime powers must
be settled according to the same principles of the U.N. Charter that
apply to peaceful resolutions of disputes over territorial waters.
II. MILITARY OPERATIONS AND THE USE
OF FORCE IN THE EEZ
The extent to which the rules and practice governing military
activities and the use of force in the territorial seas and coastal waters
will apply in the EEZ raises two questions. The first question is
whether the generalized establishment of the 200-mile zone of exclusive economic jurisdiction will affect the performance of peacetime
military activities by foreign navies in the zone. The second question
relates to the permissibility of the use of force by coastal states to
counter foreign activities or claims which such states consider incompatible with their powers in the EEZ. This second question is particularly interesting in view of the wording of both article 2(4) of the
Charter and article 301 of the Convention, which refer to the use of
force against the "territorial integrity" of another state. 34 The answer
to the second question depends on whether the term "territory"
includes the EEZ. If it does not, one must then ask to what extent the
use of force by the coastal state is permissible in its EEZ for the purpose of enforcing economic rights.
A. FOREIGN MILITARY ACTIVITY IN THE EEZ
The Convention alone provides no easy answer to the question of
how establishment of the EEZ may affect peaceful military activities
by foreign navies. Rather, the Convention's provisions on the EEZ
leave a large margin of ambiguity and uncertainty as to the nature,
status, and scope of coastal states' rights within the zone. Such ambiguity is understandable in a legal instrument whose relevant provisions
34. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4): "All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state." See also Convention, supra note 1, art. 301: "[S]tates parties shall
refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State."
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were drafted under the strain of opposing tendencies-on the one
hand, to equate the EEZ with the high seas for purposes other than
resource exploitation, and on the other, to favor extension of the functional jurisdiction of coastal states.
Article 58 of the Convention, which deals with the freedoms and
rights that remain unaffected by the establishment of the EEZ, reflects
the compromise between these opposing tendencies. 35 These rights
and freedoms are identified in part by reference to article 87, which
concerns "freedom of the high seas, '' 36 and in part made explicit by
article 58 itself, which safeguards "navigation and overflight[,] . . .
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally
lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircrafts and submarine cables and
pipelines, and compatible with other provisions of this convention. ' 37
Apart from spelling out freedom of navigation in the EEZ and in
the upper adjacent air space, article 87 does not clarify which foreign
naval military activities are lawful in the EEZ. Controversial activities
include military maneuvers; weapons tests; the gathering of strategic
information by intelligence ships or airplanes; launching, landing, or
taking on board aircraft or any other military equipment or device.
Some authors have implied that a systematic establishment of the EEZ
unavoidably leads to a situation in which the military use of the zone
by foreign navies, for purposes other than simple transit of warships,
will effectively be hampered by the necessity of incrementally respecting the role of the coastal state in the exploration and exploitation of
resources in the EEZ.38 The majority of authors who have dealt with
this rather specific issue, however, believe that military uses of the seas
remain unaffected by the establishment of the EEZ. 39
35. Convention, supra note 1, art. 58.
36. Id. art. 87.
37. Id. art. 58(1).
38. Conforti, l'institutionde la Zone Economique Exclusive en tant que Facteurdepaix
dans le Mediterranee, in MEDITERRANEE: ZONE DE PAIX (1983); Benchikh, La Mer
Mediterranee,Mer Semi-ferme, 84 REVUE GfN.RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC [R.G.D.I.P.] 284, 290 (1980).

39. Queneudec, Zone Economique Exclusive et Forces Aeronavales, in Colloque de

l'Academie de droit international,LA

GESTION DES RESSOURCES POUR L'HUMANITE: LE
DROIT DE LA MER [THE MANAGEMENT OF HUMANITY'S RESOURCE: THE LAW OF THE

SEA] 319, 322 (1982); Labrousse, Les ProblemesMilitaries Du Nouveau Droit de la Mer, id.
at 307, 313. See also ASPEKTE DER SEERECHTSENTWICKLUNG 80 (W. Vitzthum ed. 1980)
(argues in favor of the more permissive thesis by reference to article 19 of the Convention
which contains an express prohibition on military maneuvers in the course of innocent
passage); Robertson, Navigation in the Exclusive Economic Zone, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 865,
886 (1984); Oxman, supra note 7 at 838. Oxman is careful, however, in stating that
although naval maneuvers in the EEZ are permissible in principle, in practice they may not
be justifiable when they prevent the lawful enjoyment of natural resources by the coastal
state. Oxman reaches this conclusion based on the article 58(3) clause which lays down the
obligation to have "due regard to the rights and duties of the coastal states" in the EEZ.
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Whether in the years to come the generalized establishment of the
EEZ will substantially restrict foreign navies from military use of the
zone is really a matter of speculation. Much will depend upon
whether the current trend towards massive deployment of land-based
weapons will change in favor of wider use of sea-based weapons, which
presumably would result in an intensified encroachment by submarines and warships on foreign EEZs.
One should note that the attempt made during the UNCLOS III
negotiations to introduce the principle of a coastal state's consent for
the carrying out of naval operations other than navigation in the EEZ
was not successful. This attempt arose from the strong dissatisfaction
which some Latin American countries expressed in 1976-77 over the
possibility that the EEZ would remain open to such military activities
as firing of weapons, use of explosives, and military maneuvers. 4° Peru
submitted an informal proposal which would have called on warships
and military aircrafts to refrain from such "non-navigational" operations in a foreign EEZ. Even the compromise solution which the
United Kingdom suggested within the Consultative Group on the
Legal Status of the Economic Zone, i.e., to graft a reference to article
2(4) of the Charter onto what later became article 58, failed. 4 1 Contrary to such efforts to limit military uses, the legislative history of
article 58 shows a gradual movement away from the original "restrictive" drafting of the Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT), which
referred to "other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to navigation and communication," 42 toward the more permissive wording of
the final text which allows "other internationally lawful uses of the sea
. . . such as those associated with the operation of ships, aircrafts and
submarine cables and pipelines, and compatible with the other provi' 43
sions of this convention.
With some uncertainty, this thesis is also supported by a German author who concludes
that "article 58 Draft Convention adds not as much as could have been expected to the
clarification of the rights and duties of warships in foreign exclusive economic zones and
will cause uncertainties and even tensions in this respect." Wolfrum, Restrictingthe Use of
the Sea to Peaceful Purposes: Demilitarizationin Being?, 24 GER. Y.B. INT'L L. 200, 239
(1981).
40. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/SR.53 (1976/77) (particularly, the references to
Brazil and Peru therein).
41. Cf. E. RAUCH, POLITISCHE KONSEQUENZEN UND M6GLICHKEITEN DER SEERECHTSENTWICKLUNG AUS DER SICHT DER UDSSR 88 (1977).

42. Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT) of May 7, 1975, art. 47, para. 1, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.5/Part II, reprintedin THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON
THE LAW OF THE SEA: DOCUMENTS 27 (R. Platzdder ed. 1982) 1. The same wording

appeared in the Revised Single Negotiating Text of 1976, art. 46, para. 1, reprinted in id.,
208.
43. Convention, supra note 1,art. 58(1). The major maritime powers were favoring the
inclusion in the text of the simple phrase "other lawful use of the sea" which would have
left the widest latitude of interpretation. The opposing position of developing countries was
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From the text and legislative history of article 58, it seems difficult to infer that the establishment of the EEZ has involved a limitation on military operations of foreign navies other than pure
navigation and communication. Nevertheless, the provisions of the
Convention on this point, which also refer generally to international
law to determine which uses of the EEZ are lawful, leave open the
possibility that a pertinent legal regime could evolve that might favor
coastal states' exclusionary powers and control over foreign naval
operations in the EEZ. Such evolution appears more probable with
respect to the so-called enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, such as the
Mediterranean, where overlapping of the various EEZs is likely to
facilitate closer forms of cooperation in the economic management of
the EEZ. This may provide a reasonable ground for at least limiting
large-scale manuevers and the firing of weapons by foreign navies.
B.

USE OF FORCE BY THE COASTAL STATE IN THE

EEZ

No specific provision in part V of the Convention clarifies what
use of force is permissible by the coastal state to counter unwelcome
foreign activities in the EEZ. The only relevant provision is again the
article 301 general prohibition of the threat and use of force by
states." Article 301, however, as well as its Charter counterpart article 2(4), is concerned primarily with the "international" use of force,
i.e., force directed outside the territorial scope of the offending state
against another state's territory or forces. 45 These provisions are difficult to apply to the EEZ, given its amphibious status (partly subject to
the coastal state's sovereignty, partly subject to the freedom of the
high seas), because law enforcement measures against foreign ships in
the zone may be viewed either as an exercise of "domestic" police
powers or as "international" acts of force or as both.
In addition to this theoretical significance, the characterization of
a law enforcement measure has an unquestionable practical relevance.
If one assesses the use of force under the stringent standard of article
2(4) of the Charter or article 301 of the Convention, use of force will
pass the test of legality only in instances of self-defense or of absolute
necessity.4 6 If instead, one views law enforcement actions in the EEZ
as manifestations of police power within the sphere of the coastal
state's jurisdiction, the relevant legal parameters are more liberal.
They will include the specific rules on freedom of navigation, immunity of foreign ships, and customary standards for the treatment of
that the list of freedoms in the EEZ remain unaffected. See U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/
L.21/Rev. 1; U.N.Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.82.
44. Convention, supra note 1, art. 301.
45. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).

46. Convention, supra note 1; U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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aliens. The common feature of these rules is that they limit the exercise of local jurisdiction without involving a general prohibition on the
use of force.
The realistic view is to admit the possibility that certain forcible
measures in the EEZ fall outside the scope of article 2(4) of the Charter and article 301 of the Convention. The Convention itself supports
this interpretation in specific provisions that contemplate enforcement
action on the part of the coastal state. Article 73 and article 216, for
instance, concerning, respectively, the protection of economic
resources of the EEZ and pollution prevention, are examples of such
provisions. 47
Resort to coercive measures under these enforcement action provisions is an exercise of police power and should not be measured
according to the strict standard governing the international use of
force, at least as long as the force used remains limited to the functional objective of safeguarding the resources of the EEZ and its
marine environment. On the other hand, when foreign vessels and
activities in the EEZ are clearly outside the legitimate reach of coastal
state's police powers, as in the case of foreign warships, one must
assess the use of force strictly on the basis of article 2(4) and 301.
The distinction between domestic police powers and international
law provides a general criterion to identify standards governing the
use of force. It remains to describe what use of force has been considered unlawful in international practice. Historically, states have often
proved ready to resort to violent measures to exclude foreign activities
from their coastal zones of economic jurisdiction. 4 8 One of the best
known cases is the "cod war" which broke out as a consequence of
Iceland's unilateral decision to exclude foreign fishing vessels from a
fishing zone of fifty miles from the baselines around its coasts.
Although this case reached the International Court of Justice [I.C.J.]
at a time when the EEZ had not yet fully ripened into a legal institution of customary international law, the Icelandic fisheries zone was
clearly a forerunner of the EEZ.
The final judgment rendered by the Court on the 25th of July,
1974, 49 shed very little light on the question of whether Iceland could
47. Convention, supra note 1, arts. 73, 216.

48. The doctrine of necessity has justified, in the past, destruction of foreign ships to
prevent large scale damage to the marine environment and shores of the coastal state. The
doctrine was invoked, for example, to justify the bombing of the Torrey Canyon by the
British air force in 1967 and the destruction of a Greek oil tanker by the French navy off of
the coast of Corsica in July 1981. This doctrine is now incorporated in art. 221(1) of the
Law of the Sea Convention and article I of the International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties, done Nov. 29, 1969, reproduced in 9 I.L.M. 25 (1970).
49. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3.

218

CORNELL INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:203

lawfully resort to force for the enforcement of its fisheries legislation.
Although both plaintiffs (the United Kingdom and the Federal
Republic of Germany) had asked the Court to declare Iceland responsible for its acts of harassment against British and German vessels fishing in the contested zone, the final decision avoided the issue.50 The
Court concluded that it could not declare Iceland liable because evidence of the specific damage caused by Iceland's patrol boats was
insufficient.5 1
The I.C.J. had another opportunity to assess the limits of the use
of force for the protection of coastal state's rights in areas of economic
jurisdiction. In the continental shelf dispute between Greece and Turkey, the issue of the permissibility of military measures to support the
respective claims was implicit in Greece's application for interim
measures of protection.5 2 The Court again did not take advantage of
this opportunity; it chose instead to declare that the particular circumstances of the case did not require the adoption of provisional meas53
ures under article 41 of the I.C.J. Statute.
Other precedents in international practice, however, shed some
light on the issue of force in areas of economic jurisdiction. In the Red
Crusaderincident of May 1961, a British trawler attempted to escape
from Danish fishing waters, where it had been caught by a Danish
patrol boat. During the escape, the Red Crusaderwas hit by several
gunshots fired by the pursuing Danish vessel. The Commission of
Inquiry set up by Denmark and the United Kingdom rendered an
opinion in which the violent action undertaken by the Danish ship was
considered to have "exceeded legitimate use of armed force on two
counts: (a) firing without warning of solid gun-shot; (b) creating danger to human life on board the Red Crusaderwithout proved necessity, by effective firing at the Red Crusader. ....-54
The Red Crusaderincident is probably the most restrictive precedent on the scope of legitimate use of force in the enforcement of
50. Only a brief discussion of the relevant submission can be found at paragraphs 73-76
of the judgment rendered with respect to the Federal Republic of Germany.
51. Fisheries Jurisdiction, supra note 49. Among the violent acts committed by Iceland were the shooting at the British trawler Everton in 1973 and the shooting by the
Icelandic gunboat Thor of another British trawler in July 1974 after a 12 hour pursuit. See
Tracy, The Enforcement of Canada's ContinentalMaritimeJurisdiction, ORAE Report n.
R 44, 67 (1975).
52. Aegean Sea ContinentalShelf Case, 1976 I.C.J. 3.
53. Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 41(1), 1977 U.N.Y.B. 1193
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945): "The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any provisional measures which ought to be taken to
preserve the respective rights of either party." Article 41(2) requires that the Court give
notice of suggested provisional measures to the U.N. Security Council.
54. The Red Crusader(Den. v. U.K.), 35 INT'L L. REP. 485 (1962) (the Commission of
Inquiry was composed of C. de Visscher, A. Gros, and Capt. C. Moolenburgh).
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coastal states' fishing rights. It implies the existence of an interna-

tional law standard prohibiting the use of force in the pursuit of an
offending fishing vessel unless required by self-defense.
The American-Canadian Commission reached a similar conclusion in the well-known case of the S.S. I'm Alone. 5 The Commission
was asked to decide whether the sinking by the United States Coast
Guard vessels of the I'm Alone, a ship of Canadian registry engaged in
rum-running, was justified on the bases of the right of hot pursuit and
of the necessity of preventing the smuggling of liquors into the United
States. The Commission examined the case on the bases both of the
Anglo-American Liquor Convention of 1924, which allowed search
and seizure of Canadian registered vessels within the four-hour sailing
zone from the American coast, and of customary international law.
Although the Commission left a certain margin for the use of moderate force short of intentional sinking, it held that the sinking of the I'm
Alone breached both the Anglo-American Liquor Convention and

international law.
Even in incidents involving illegal fishing or illegal trade by for-

eign vessels, which are not brought before international tribunals, the
state of the ship against which force was directed has usually lodged

strong protests. The naval forces or a'rcraft of several Latin American
states, for instance, have shot at United States tuna vessels on various
56
occasions to enforce their 200-mile coastal jurisdiction.
Although the assertion of a 200-mile territorial sea complicated
the issue of the permissibility of force in these Latin American cases,
the United States invariably protested the action and reserved the
right to claim compensation.5 7 Similarly, the Soviet Union delivered a
strong note of protest to the Argentinean Government in 1968 when
55. 3 R. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 1609 (1949). See Fitzmaurice, The Case of the I'm
Alone, 17 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 82, 99 (1936). Fitzmaurice maintains that the narrow scope
of permissible use of force determined by the Commission can be explained by the fact that
the order to stop had been given outside territorial waters, in the area of special jurisdiction
under the liquor treaties.
56. Among the most serious incidents were those involving (1) the Artic Maid, 27
March 1955, which resulted in seizure of the vessel and wounding of crew members by
Ecuadoran patrol boats; (2) the Normandie, 13 December 1957, shot at by a Chilean aircraft 25 miles off the Chilean coast; (3) the Jo Linda, 23 February 1962, shot at by a
Columbian warship at about 25 miles from the coast; (4) the Lou Jean, 28 April 1962, shot
at and seized by El Salvador's naval units at a distance of about 15 miles from the coast.
An account of these cases is given in 3 I.L.M. 26 (1964). For an examination of other
incidents off Latin American coasts, see Note, TerritorialWaters and the Onassis case, 11
THE WORLD TODAY 1 (1955); Kunz, ContinentalShelfand InternationalLaw: Confusion
andAbuse, 50 AM. J. INT'L L. 828 (1956).
57. See, e.g., 38 Fed. Reg. 34,799 (11 Dec. 1973 memorandum by President Nixon to
the Secretary of State regarding withholding over $2 million in funds provided for Equador
and Peru under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, an amount equal to reimbursements
made for fishing vessels seized by those two nations, noted at 13 I.L.M. 500 (1974)).
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the Argentinean destroyer Santa Cruz hit the Soviet fishing vessel
Golfstrim with a round of explosive shells fired within the 200-mile
58
territorial sea.
Episodes involving use of military force against foreign vessels
usually engaged in fishing activities have also been frequent in the
Mediterranean. Libyan aircraft attacked Italian fishing boats on various occasions at distances ranging between thirty and fifty miles from
the coast. After the shooting of the Italian boats Borghea and Di Cristofaro in 1973, the Italian government presented a note of protest to
the Libyan foreign minister Jalloud and accepted his apologies to the
Italian ambassador in Tripoli. 59
The majority of precedents shows that the state of the flag has
normally protested the use of force undertaken by the coastal state for
the purpose of enforcing its economic jurisdiction. In the few cases in
which the use of force has given rise to an international adjudication
or conciliation procedure, the conclusions reached suggest that the use
of military force, such as shooting and thereby endangering the ship's
safety, wounding or killing members of the crew, or causing outright
sinking of the vessel, is to be considered contrary to international law.
On the other hand, a reasonable degree of force appears permissible
where serious violations of the coastal state's rights require an immediate enforcement action in order to prevent further harmful consequences. Thus, the coastal state may act to secure evidence of the
violation, to arrest the ship, or to compel it to discontinue the unlawful
activity.
The precedents reviewed above, and particularly the I'm Alone
case, support the view that shooting for the purpose of warning and
arresting, or even with the intention of partially disabling the ship for
persistent refusal to comply or attempted escape, is permissible. At
the same time, none of the above precedents warrants the conclusion
that, apart from self-defense and necessity, the use of deadly force with
the intent of sinking a foreign vessel in the EEZ or of causing death or
grievous bodily harm to the crew is consistent with international law.
58. The Argentinean reply simply communicated that the matter could have been settled before local courts. United States policy in this period was characterized by a system
of direct indemnification of American vessels arrested or fired upon in Latin American
waters. The government was then reserving itself the right to claim back the relative sums
at the intergovernmental level. See Note, Seizures of United States Fishing Vessels-The
Status of the Wet War, 6 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 428 (1969).

59. Rousseau, Chronique desfaits internationaux,78 R.G.D.I.P. 1096, 1176 (1974).
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THE "PEACEFUL USE" CLAUSES IN THE LAW OF
THE SEA CONVENTION

The Convention adopted the principle of "peaceful use" or
"peaceful purpose" in scattered provisions that deal with the open
seas, the EEZ, and the seabed.60 At the outset, one may ask whether
the introduction of the "peaceful use" clauses in the Convention
involves an exclusion or substantial limitation of peacetime military
use of the oceans. If so, the exclusion or limitation of military activities would a fortiori exclude the use of force.
As a recurrent leitmotifin the text of the Convention, rather than
the object of a specific section, the "peaceful use" clause appears to
have general application. The most prominent "peaceful use" provision is article 88, which asserts that "[the] high seas shall be reserved
for peaceful purposes. '6 1 Article 58 applies this general provision to
62
the EEZ, insofar as it is compatible with the EEZ's legal regime.
Under the slightly different formulation of "peaceful purposes," the
same principle applies to the use of the seabed beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction 63 and therefore conditions the legality of several
types of activities in the Area,64 particularly the conduct of maritime
scientific research 65 and the use of mining installations. 66 Because the
above provisions cover the high seas, the international Area, and the
EEZ, and because the requirement of "innocent passage" mandates
that navigation in foreign territorial waters be "peaceful," practically
no area of the sea escapes the application of the "peaceful use"
principle.
This being established, it remains to clarify whether the "peaceful
use" clause only represents a specific application of article 2(4) of the
U.N. Charter, 67 which, in the law of the sea context, enjoins the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state; or whether "peaceful use" involves an autonomous
60. See, eg., Convention, supra note 1, arts. 58, 88, 141, 301.
61. Id. art. 88.
62. Id. art. 58. Article 58(2) incorporates the mandate of article 88 by reference.
63. Convention, supra note 1, art. 141. Article 141 states that "[t]he Area shall be
open to use exclusively for peaceful purposes by all States."
64. "For the purposes of [the] Convention. . . 'Area' means the seabed and ocean
Convention,
floor and subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.
supra note 1, art. 1(I).
65. Id. art. 143(1).
66. Article 147 provides that installations used for carrying out activities in the Area
are subject to various conditions among which are that "such installations shall be used
exclusively for peaceful purposes." Id. art. 147(2)(d).
67. "All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations." U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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normative concept entailing a specific obligation to restrict the use of
the sea to peaceful purposes and thus bans military activities.
A minority of authors holds the latter view, as did the developing
states in the Law of the Sea Conference.6 8 One also finds support for
this argument favoring the limitation of use of the sea to peaceful purposes by analogy to other international instruments that adopt the
"peaceful use" clause to exclude militarization. Such instruments
70
include the Antarctic Treaty, 6 9 the Outer Space and Moon Treaty,

71
as well as the Spitzbergen and Aaland Island treaties.
The opposite view-that "peaceful use" or "peaceful purpose"
must be understood as not limiting, much less excluding military
activities in the oceans-received the strong support of the major maritime powers, especially the United States. The United States delegate
vividly expressed his government's view in the course of the Law of
the Sea Conference:

The United States had consistently held that the conduct of military activities
for peaceful purposes was in full accord with the Charter of the United Nations
and with the principles of international law. Any specific limitation on military activities would require the negotiation of detailed arms control agreement. The Conference was not charged with such a purpose and was not
prepared for such negotiations. Any attempt to turn the Conference's attention to such a complex task would quickly bring to an end current efforts to
72
negotiate a law of the sea convention.

The question arises, "Which of these two diverging views on the

normative value of the 'peaceful use' principle finally prevailed in the
Law of the Sea Convention?" It seems unrealistic to interpret the
"peaceful purposes" clauses of the Convention as affecting military

fleets' navigation at sea, which is lawful under customary international
law and the U.N. Charter. 73 On the contrary, military vessels enjoy a
68. Early Soviet literature points in this direction. See E. RAUCH, supra note 41, at 21.
Cf. Malta, 5 UNCLOS III O.R. (67th plenary mtg.), para. 75; Ecuador, id., para. 2. With
reference to demilitarization of special zones, see Madagascar, id., para. 14; Cuba, id., para.
71; Bulgaria, id., para. 66.
69. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, art. 1, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 7"1.
70. Treaty on the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410,
T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. The view that this treaty involves complete demilitarization of outer space is disputed. See J.E.S. FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF OUTER SPACE (1968); Poulantzas, The Outer Space Treaty of27 January 1967, A

Decisive Step Towards Arms Control, Demilitarization of Outer Space and International
Supervision, 20 REVUE HELLIfNIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 66 (1967). Poulantzas

maintains that the principle of full demilitarization expressly applied to the moon and other
celestial bodies applies as well to outer space, that is, the orbit surrounding the earth. Contra Stein, Legal Restraints in Modern Arms Control Agreements, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 255,
261 (1972); Wolfrum, supra note 38, at 202.
71. Treaty Relating to Spitzbergen, Feb. 9, 1920, 2 L.N.T.S. 7; Convention Concerning
the Non-Fortification and Neutralisation of Aaland Islands, Oct. 20, 1921, 9 L.N.T.S. 212.
72. 5 UNCLOS III O.R. (67th plenary mtg.), para. 81.
73. See Wolfrum, supra note 39, at 213 and literature cited therein.
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privileged status under the Convention, both with respect to their
complete immunity and to the monopoly they have on law enforcement action. 74 Therefore, it appears that only those military activities
which fall into the category of aggressive acts, such as unlawful blockade, mining of sea ways, threat and use of force, and waging of war are
per se prohibited. Article 301 of the Convention, under the title
"peaceful use of the seas," indicates that "[i]n exercising their rights
and performing their duties under this Convention, States parties shall
refrain from any threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the principles of international law embodied in the Char75
ter of the United Nations.
Article 301 appears among the provisions of general application
under part XVI of the Convention. Despite a slight difference in drafting, article 301 is obviously modeled on article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter. It contains the same reference to the prohibition of threat or use
of force as well as the same indication of the protected values-territorial integrity and political independence-against which force must
not be directed. Such a provision, with its qualified prohibition of the
use of military force, would have had little meaning if the "peaceful
use" principle was intended to ban military activities per se from the
oceans.
Other textual arguments supporting interpretation of the "peaceful use" clause as not restricting foreign military activities outside
national waters can be found in the provisions of the Convention regulating passage of warships in foreign territorial waters. Article 19 of
the Convention contains a detailed list of the activities which are
incompatible with the notion of "innocent passage."' 76 Among them
are typical military operations such as the "exercise and practice with
weapons," launching, landing, or taking on board of any aircraft." If
these and other operations are excluded by a special clause when a
foreign ship transits through the territorial sea, it must logically be
understood that such operations are permissible in the ocean beyond
national jurisdiction.
These conclusions apply also with respect to military activities on
the seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction. Early negoti74. T. Treves, Le Nouveau Regime des EspacesMarins et la Circumlation des Navires,
Colloque Objectifmer, mer Institutions face anxnouvelles donnes de ]a presence en muer 12
(1983); Treves, La notion d'utilisationdes espaces marinsa desfinspacifiquesdans le noveau
droit de la mer, 1980 ANNUAIRE FRANqAIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 698 (author refers
to the peaceful use clause as "soft lav").
75. Convention, supra note 1, art. 301.
76. Article 19 thus differs from the corresponding article adopted at Geneva in 1958.
See Convention on the Territorial Sea, supra note 5, art. 14.
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ations following Malta's proposal for a declaration of the international
seabed as the "common heritage of mankind" 77 proceeded from a
widespread conviction that such proposals should lead to complete
demilitarization of the seabed. The paramount concern in the mid1960's was that the seabed should not become an area for military
competition. However, as the problem of resource exploitation moved
increasingly to the forefront of the international seabed negotiations,
the issue of demilitarization of the ocean floor was removed from the
General Assembly Committee for the Peaceful Use of the Sea Bed and
Ocean Floor and became a subject for arms control negotiations
within the Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee (ENDC). The
United States and the Soviet Union supported this formal separation
of competence and set the stage for the subsequent development of the
seabed arms control negotiations toward the adoption of the 1972 Sea
Bed Treaty. 78 That Treaty does not prohibit the military use as such
of the seabed; rather, it prohibits only the emplacement of nuclear
weapons and weapons of mass destruction in the seabed beyond the
coastal zone of twelve miles defined by reference to the 1958 Geneva
79
Convention on the Territorial Sea.
It appears from the above that, in principle, the "peaceful use"
clause in the Law of the Sea Convention does not impair the exercise
of sea power in its conventional military forms. Therefore, as far as
the high seas and the international Area are concerned, states remain
free to use the sea for navigation of their fleets of war, including submarines either submerged or on the surface. States also remain free to
use the sea for military maneuvers, testing and firing of conventional
weapons, emplacement of military devices on the seabed, and installation of defensive weapons and weapons for the conduct of conventional war.
77. See U.N. Doe. A/6695, para. 2 (9 August 1967). Malta requested the inclusion of
a supplementary item in the agenda of the Twenty-Second Session entitled "Declaration
and Treaty Concerning the Reservation Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes of the Sea Bed
and Ocean Floor Underlying the Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction,
and the Use of their Resources for the Interests of Mankind." See also U.N. Doc. A/C, I/
PV 1515 (Provisional Verbatim Record of the meeting of the First Standing Committee
regarding Malta's proposal for a treaty governing the exploitation and use of the seabed).
78. Sea Bed Treaty, supra note 15. For a drafting history of the Treaty and detailed
analysis of its content, see L. MIGLIORINO, FONDI MARINI E ARMI DI DISTRUZIONE DI
MASSA (1980) (with extensive bibliographic material). See also Treves, Military Installations, Structuresand Devices on the Seabed, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 808 (1980); L. Merciai, La
Demilitarisationdes Fonds Marins, 88 R.G.D.I.P. 46 (1984).
79. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Other special limitations on the military
use of the seabed can be derived from the previously noted 1963 Treaty on the prohibition
of nuclear experiments in the atmosphere and underwater, see supra note 17, as well as
from the Tlatelolco Treaty of 1967 that banned nuclear activities in Latin America, supra
note 18.

1985)

NEW LAW OF THE SEA

This conclusion does not imply, however, that the "peaceful use"
clauses will not produce any useful legal effects. Despite their lack of
an autonomous normative content, such clauses may provide an interpretative criterion for the Convention and for the general principle of
the freedom of the seas. Under such a criterion, whenever military
activities come into conflict with peaceful uses, the former must yield
to the latter. This is true not only with respect to the EEZ, where
economic activities fall within the sovereignty of the coastal state, but
also with respect to the area beyond national jurisdiction, where eventual exploration and exploitation of seabed minerals may well give rise
to a problem of competition between military activities and economic
use of ocean space. A standard of preference for economic use is not
only logically justified in view of the necessary localization of resourcerelated activities, but above all permits at least some legal effectiveness
to be given to the "peaceful use" clauses and to the ordinary meaning
of their language. This is in accordance with article 31(l) of the
Vienna Convention and with the general principle of effectiveness, or
effet utile, under which, between two possible interpretations-one
depriving a provision of any effect and the other permitting some legal
efficacy-one must choose the latter. 80
CONCLUSION
The establishment of the EEZ, the adoption of straight baselines,
and the closing of large gulfs as historic or "vital" waters has resulted
in a constant widening of coastal states' maritime jurisdiction. The
progressive development of both the customary and conventional law
of the sea shows that this widening of maritime jurisdiction has been
accompanied by an increased emphasis on peaceful use of the oceans
and the need to ban the use of force at sea. The widening of maritime
jurisdiction and emphasis on peaceful use, however, have not been
directed toward the objective of reducing military uses of the sea and
preventing or limiting military conflict. On the contrary, disputes concerning military activities are subject to the "optional exception"
under the dispute settlement machinery which the Convention provides. This limits the possibility of the Convention's developing a
body of rules capable of reconciling the widespread increase of exclu80. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27
(1969), reprintedin 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875 n. 275 (1969): "A treaty shall be interpreted in
good faith and in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose."
The principle of effectiveness, or effet utile, is discussed by Lauterpacht, Restrictive Interpretationand the Principleof Effectiveness in the Interpretationof Treaties, 1949 BRIT. Y.B.
INT'L L. 72.
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sive claims to coastal jurisdiction with the continuing insistence by
naval war fleets on unimpeded freedom of the seas.
Taking this basic tension between the maritime needs of coastal
states and foreign powers as a starting point, this Article has described
the present limits of military activities and force in the sea areas within
national jurisdiction. With respect to the territorial sea, internal
waters, and the EEZ, one must distinguish between use of force in the
pursuit of "police powers" and the "transborder" use of force under
article 2(4) of the Charter. Many of the precedents reviewed indicate
that coastal states' action in repelling or arresting foreign intruders
represents an exercise of police power which does not constitute a
primafacie violation of article 2(4) of the Charter. At the same time,
the legality of such actions must be judged in light of the general principles of necessity and proportionality. Armed force for the purpose
of enforcement action should normally be deemed impermissible when
the national jurisdiction claimed by the coastal state has given rise to
international disputes. In such situations (e.g., the Gulf of Sirte incident), there is a duty to resolve the dispute by peaceful means in
accordance with articles 2(3) and 33 of the Charter.
On the other hand, the threat or use of force by naval powers to
challenge coastal states' claims over adjacent sea areas is acceptable to
some extent. As the Corfu Channel case indicates, the simple action of
"showing the flag" by foreign warships, without provocative acts or
intimidation, is permissible, especially where such ships are crossing
bays or other areas of the sea previously open to navigation. Even
under these circumstances, however, conflicts and disputes must be
submitted to procedures of peaceful solution under the U.N. Charter.
With respect to military activities within and beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction, the relevant provisions of the Convention and its
preparatory works reveal that the "peaceful use" clauses of the Convention have not created any new obligation to limit military uses of
the sea. However, since every treaty must be interpreted so as to give
useful effect to its provisions, such clauses do provide an interpretative
criterion for the purpose of favoring peaceful activities whenever these
activities conflict with exclusive claims to occupation of the sea areas
for military purposes. This conclusion applies all the more to the EEZ
which, through customary law as reflected in the Convention, is subject to the economic sovereignty of the coastal state.

